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wholly from the principle that guilt is personal and ought not be
lightly imputed.2 1 In the public interest of insuring prudence in the
conduct of the business of the Buffalo Pharmacal Co., a majority
of the Justices deemed it wise to place a criminal stigma on the
defendant; a stigma that is predicated wholly upon chance, for it
necessarily follows that in the absence of fraud, participation, acquiescense, or even negligence, the act of adulteration and misbranding was
not within Dotterweich's power of human control. 22 It is submitted
that the public interest could be as adequately protected, without a
serious departure from established criminal law doctrines, by placing
a presumption of guilt and a burden of proof upon the corporate
officer.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD HELD RES JUDICATA
AS TO SECOND RECOVERY IN ANOTHER STATE.
Respondent resided, and was hired, in Louisiana as a laborer on
a Texas oil well owned by the petitioner. In the course of this employment, Hunt was injured; he received a compensation award under
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act.' By the terms of the Texas
Act this award became final. 2 Respondent later 3 brought an action
under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act 4 to recover for
his injury; petitioner's exception was overruled and judgment was
rendered for Hunt less the amount of the Texas payments. The
Louisiana Appellate Court affirmed this decision,5 with the Louisiana
Supreme Court refusing to review. On writ of certiorari, held, reversed. A compensation award of one state which has become final is
21.
22.

See instant case at 139.
See Hall, "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law" (1941)
89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549, 568, and Hall, "Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II" (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 986-996.
1. Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) art. 8306 through 8309.
2. Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) art. 8307, § 5, which states in
substance that a party, dissatisfied with the award of the Industrial Accident Board, may review the award by giving notice
within twenty days that he will not conform to it and within
twenty days after giving such notice, he must bring suit in thd
proper court. If no notice is given or no suit is brought within
the limited time, the award of the Board shall be final and binding.
3. Hunt brought the Louisiana suit on December 18, 1940. His
accident occurred on May 25, 1939, payments for which began on
June 9, 1939 by petitioner's insurer; the payments continued until
October 26, 1940 or thereabouts when Hunt's attorneys informed
respondent that they were going to bring the Louisiana suit.
Disregarding adequate notice of the Texas board's hearing, Hunt
did not attend, and on December 3, 1940 a decision was made
from which Hunt did not appeal.
4. La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) §§ 4391 through 4434.
5. Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., La. App. , 10 So. (2d)
109 (1942).
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entitled, under the full faith and credit clause,r to the same recognition
in a sister state; since Texas held such an award comparable to a
judgment of a court,7 Louisiana must render it like treatment. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 64 Sup. Ct. 208 (1943).
(Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting.)S
By reason of the interstate character of modern business and employment thereunder, it frequently occurs that an emlloyee contracts
for work in one state and is subsequently injured or killed in the
course of his employment in a second state. The problem then arises
as to which state's compensation act9 should apply,10 since most of
the acts cover not only injuries within the state but ,.Iso injuries beyond the state when the contract was made within the state; this
latter type of coverage is often spoken of as the "extra-territorial"
application of the acts. The bases adopted by the coitrts for the application of one act or the other are threefold: (1) a contract theory,
(2) a tort theory, and (3) a theory of statutory regulation of the status
of employment."1 The idea of status is now dominant in most jurisdictions;12 by the very token of this, the action brought by the em6.

U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each State to the public acts, records, and judi,,ial proceedings
of every other State; and the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect thereof." See also the supplemental
acts of Congress: 1 Stat. 122 (1790), as amended, 2 Stat. 298
(1804), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1928).
7. Middlebrook v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. -,
112 S.W. (2d) 311 (1937), wherein the court said at 315, ".
our courts have uniformily held that the award of the [workmen's compensation] board has all of the force and effect of a
judgment, and is binding on all parties, unless and until legally set
aside." Accord, Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Baker, Tex.
Civ. App. -,
111 S.W. (2d) 837, 839-840 (1937) ; Ocean Accident
& Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Pruitt et al., T,x. Comm. App.
, 58 S.W. (2d) 41, 45 (1933).
8. The majority included Mr. Justice Jackson only ,y a concurring
opinion. Instant case at 217. He founded his opinion on the
basis of the result of Williams et al. v. State of North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287 (1942), which held that North Carolina must give
full faith and credit to a Nevada judgment of divorce; in deference to that decision, Justice Jackson preferred not to dissent
in the Magnolia case as he did in the Williams suit, id. at 311.
9. Forty-six states had workmen's compensation acts in 1936. Dodd,
"Administration of Workmen's Compensation" (1936) 28. In
1939 Arkansas adopted such an act. Ark. Actz 1939, No. 319,
p. 777 et seq. Mississippi remains the lone state without an act.
10. It should be noted that no choice of act is indicated by the Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934), as between the state of
contract (§ 398) and the state of injury (§ 399); see also § 402.
11. Goodrich, "Handbook of the Conflict of Laws" (1938) 241; Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) "introductory note" to
Workmen's Compensation at 485; Dunlap, "The Conflict of Laws
and Workmen's Compensation" (1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 381,
382-383.
12. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California
et al., 294 U.S. 532, 541 (1935), in which Justice 'tone stated that
". . the liability under workmen's compensation acts . . . is
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ployee is neither tort nor contract but a "statutory hybrid" to which
orthodox conflict theories are inapplicable."
That the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act covered Hunt's
Texas injury is explicit in the terms of its act; 14 but that the Texas Act
applied to Hunt is equally manifest. 15 Therefore he had the possibility of a rec6very in either state. Perchance because he was then
hospitalized in Texas, Hunt voluntarily proceeded and obtained an
award under the act of that state.
It should be observed that the Louisiana court, in Hunt's second
action, expressly conceded " . . . that all proceedings before that
[Texas] Board and the awards made by it have the same force and
effect as proceedings before and judgments rendered by courts of
competent jurisdiction in that state."' 8 But the Louisiana court rebutted this result by saying, in substance, that it would pay no attention to what Texas held, and that since Hunt's contract and domicile were established in Louisiana, Louisiana's "interest" in Hunt was
"great" enough to allow him to recover under its act. 17 For such
reasoning the Louisiana court resorted to the Alaska Packers Association case,' 8 in which it was asserted that the Supreme Court has
.often recognized " . . . that there are some limitations upon the
,extent to which a state will be required by the full faith and credit
clause to enforce even the judgment of another state, in contravention
of its own statutes or policy."' 19 However, had the Louisiana court
perused further into the Alaska case, it would have found that the
Supreme Court said it would resolve for itself the limits one state
may impose as to rights obtained in another state. 20 Thus, up to the
date of the instant case, the United States Supreme Court has ex-

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

imposed as an incident of the employment relationship, as a cost
to be borne by the business enterprise, rather than as an attempt
to extend redress for the wrongful act of the employer."
Note (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 226.
La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) § 4393(3) which states: "Every
contract of hiring . . . between an employer and an employee
engaged in any trade . . . specified . . . shall be presumed to
have been made subject to the provisions of this act, unless there
be . . . an express statement . . . that the provisions of this
act . . . are not intended to apply . . . . "
Texas Statutes (Vernon, 1936) art. 8306, § 3 (b), which provides:
"If an employee . . . sustains an injury in the course of his employment, he shall be compensated by the association . . . if
his employer is a subscriber at the time of the injury."
, 10 So. (2d)
La. App. Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 109, 113 (1942).
Id. at 114.
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California
et al., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547, where in effect it is stated that the limits by which
the statute of one state may modify or deny rights asserted under
another's statute presents a question under the full faith and
credit clause which the United States Supreme Court, upon review of a state court's judgment, must determine for itself.
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clusively determined the extent of the application of the full faith and
credit clause.21
To the extent that the Supreme Court, in the case at bar, releases
itself from answering the questions of (1) whether or not a state has
"sufficient interest" in an employee to award him corpensation, and
(2) whether or not that state must give full faith E.nd credit to a
prior award of another state, a step is taken to make law out of chaos.
Heretofore, to determine these answers in a final sense, a review of
the "circumstances" of the injured employee and of the "governmental
interest" of the states concerned was required in each case to be taken
22
to the Supreme Court.
In addition, the Supreme Court did not here limit the loci where
an award may be obtained, but it did say that if an award was granted
under an act whereby such award became final, then that award was
entitled to full faith and credit and was, therefore, res judicata in
an action under a second state's act. Moreover, full faith and credit
3
requires that "not some, but full" faith and credit be given.2
The prevailing view of rejecting pleas of res judiccta and estoppel
as to the first state's award2 4 was followed by the Louisiana court.
Under this view an action could be brought in the se.ond state, notwithstanding the fact that an award was made in the first state, but
the amount already received under the latter's act would be allowed
as a credit.25
The minority view denies a second recovery usually on the grounds
of election, estoppel, or res judicata.26
It is significant that most common among the workmen's compensation cases is one in which the acts of the states of contract and
21.

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.

Williams et al. v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302
(1942); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc. et al., 314 U.S.
201, 210 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. et al., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939); Titus v. Wallick,
306 U.S. 282, 291 (1939); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268, 274 (1935).
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California
et al., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Bradford Eletric Light Co.,
Inc. v. Clapper, Adm'x, 286 U.S. 145, 164 (1932). It might be
pointed out that the dissenting opinions rely on the "governmental
interest" Louisiana had in the instant case; Justice Douglas at 217,
and Justice Black at 219, 221.
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938); Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 562, 567 (1906).
Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N.E. 847 (1933); Miller v.
National Chair Co. et al., 129 N.J.L. 98, 28 A. (2d) 125 (1942);
Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co., Inc. et al., 210 App. Div. 543,
206 N.Y. Supp. 458 (3rd Dept. 1924); Price v. Horton Motor Lines,
Inc. et al., 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E. (2d) 744 (1942); Salvation Army
et al. v. Industrial Comm. et al., 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349
(1935).
Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) § 403.
Ritenour v. Creamery Service, 19 N.J.Misc. 82, 17 A. (2d) 283
(Dept. of Labor 1941); Hughey v. Ware et al., 34 N.M. 29, 276
Pac. 27 (1929); Minto v. Hitehings & Co. et al, 204 App. Div.
661, 198 N.Y. Supp. 610 (3rd Dept. 1923); De Gray v. Miller Bros.
Construction Co., Inc. et al., 106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556 (1934).
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injury are variously asserted by the plaintiff and defendant depending
on the circumstances. As to this situation the Supreme Court made
no decision; its holding affects only the circumstance in which there
27
has been a "prior" determination, as existed in the instant case.
But that other of the states, by statute or by judicial decision, have
regarded an unappealed compensation award as final is evident.2
The majority opinion relied heavily upon the decision of the
Schendel-Elder cases 29 to reach the holding in the instant case.30
In the former suits, actions were brought in Minnesota by two employees under the Federal Employers Liability Act, which act, to be
applicable, required the employer and employees to be engaged in
interstate commerce at the time of injury or death. The railway
pleaded in bar to these suits previous determinations made under the
27.

28.

29.
30.

See note 7 supra. The legal writing has in the past been contrary to the decision in the instant case. 2 Beale, "A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws" (1935) § 403.1; Dodd, "Administration of Workmen's Compensation" (1936) 819-820; Goodrich,
"Handbook of the Conflict of Laws" (1938) 243, 244; Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) § 403; Dunlap, "The Conflict
of Laws and Workmen's Compensation" (1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev.
381, 396-397; Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict
of Laws" (1927) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 345; id. (1935) 20 id.
19, 41-43; Note (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1119; cf. Stumberg,
"Principles of Conflict of Laws" (1937) 195-196; Angell, "Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injuries Abroad"
(1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 627; Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 867,
873.
Magma Copper Co. v. Naglich et al., Ariz.-, 131 P. (2d)
357, 360 (1942); McIntyre et al. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.,
Inc., 126 Conn. 491, 12 A. (2d) 544, 545-546 (1940); Conn. Gen.
Stat. (1930) § 5251; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. et al.
v. Camp, Ga. App.-, 26 S.E. (2d) 679, 681 (1943); Ga.
Code (1933) § 114-710; Swift & Co. v. Industrial Comm. et al.,
381 Ill. 77, 44 N.E. (2d) 842, 844 (1942) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Bar Ass'n
Ed., 1943) c. 48, § 156 (f); Thompson et al. v. A. J. Thompson
Stone Co., 81 Ind. App. 442, 449-450, 144 N.E. 150, 152-153 (1924) ;
Galvin v. Brown, 71 Ind. App. 30, 34, 121 N.E. 447, 448 (1919);
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1512; Iowa Code (Reichman,
1939) §§ 1452, 1465; Dolner v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., Neb.
, 9 N.W.(2d) 483, 484 (1943) ; Laws of Neb. (1935) c.57, § 13
(4); Hull v. Hercules Powder Co. et al., 20 N.J. Misc. 168, 26 A.
(2d) 164, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1942); N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 34:15-58;
Laws of N.Y. (1938) c. 585, § 17; State ex rel. Waller v. Industrial Comm., Ohio App.-,
50 N.E. (2d) 680, 683 (1943);
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 1465-90; Farmers Nat.
Grain co. et al. v. Gardner et al., 189 Okla. 375, 116 P. (2d) 971,
972 (1941); Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 85 § 29; Flowers v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. et al., 145 Pa. Super. 230, 20 A.
(2d) 856, 863. (1941) ; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 77, § 833; Le
Bire v. Dep't of Labor & Industries et al., 14 Wash. (2d) 407, 128
P. (2d) 308, 312 (1942) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932)
§ 7697; Harris v. State Compensation Comm'r et al., W.
Va.-,
25 S.E.(2d) 190, 191 (1943); W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
Sublett, and Stedman, 1943) § 2545.
Chicago, R. I. & Pacific Ry. v. Schendel, Adm'r; The Same v.
Elder, 270 U.S. 611 (1926).
Instant case at 215.
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compensation act of Iowa which held that the employefs were engaged
in intrastate commerce, and by that reason could recover under the
Iowa Act. For one employee the Iowa Compensation Commission made
an award which was sustained on appeal to the Iowa District Court.
For the other employee the Commission made an award which was not
yet final since the appeal to the Commission was perding. The Supreme Court held that the final determination on appeal to the Iowa
court which decided that the first employee was engaged in intrastate
commerce was a judgment entitled to full faith and credit, and therefore res judicata; also, that the appeal was still pending for the second
employee, so his award was not final and not entitled to full faith and
credit. From this decision it is clear that final judicial action was
taken by an Iowa Court; the Supreme Court left unanswered the problem present there, and here, of whether or not the final award of a
compensation commission is per se entitled to full faith and credit.31°
As an ultimate solvent for the conflict problems present under
forty-seven different workmen's compensation acts,3 2 several writers
have suggested that a uniform act should be adopted. 33 In view of
the usual obstacles to the passage of a comprehensive uniform act,
it might be well to urge the passage of a single uriform provision
which would answer the conflict existent in the instant case; such a
provision is as follows:
"Extraterritorial effect.-Where the injury occurs outsile of this State,
the provisions of this act shall apply if the contract of hire was
made in this State: Provided, however, That if the injury occurs
in a State that has provided workmen's compensation for such employee and his dependents, an election of benefits wader the law of
such other State shall be held to waive the claimant's rights under
the provisions of this act. Such an election to waive the benefits
of this act shall be evidenced by an instrument in writing, to be
signed by the injured employee, indicating his acceptince of the provisions of the law of such other State, which election shall be binding
after approval by the industrial commission of thi3 State. Credit
shall be given an employer or insurer under this act for all benefits
paid or furnished 34
to an employee or his dependents under whatever
assumption made."
31.
32.
33.

34.

Stumberg, "Principles of Conflict of Laws" (1937) 196; Dwan,
"Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of laws" (1927) 11
Minn. L. Rev. 329, 330.
See note 8 supra.
Dodd, "Administration of Workmen's Compensation" (1936) 821,
824; Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws"
(1927) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 352; Tolle, "Some Comparisons Between State Compensation Acts" (1940) 12 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 77,
111.
Proceedings of the International Ass'n of Industrial Accident
Boards & Commissions, "Report of Committee on Workmen's
Compensation Legislation" (1933) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 577, pp. 15-16.

